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Abstract 
The emergence of the Islamic State as a regional and ideological player deeply affected the 
mechanisms of radicalization witnessed worldwide. The article will compare a former instance of 
jihadism, the Egyptian al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG), with the phenomenon of the 
Islamic State and its wilāyāt system. The Islamic Group, which has been active during the last three 
decades of the Twentieth century, constitutes an ideal case study because it performed a process of 
political de-radicalization and disengagement that led its members to abandon violence. The 
hypothesis underlying the paper is that a similar process could no longer take place in the case of the 
Islamic State. Indeed, the transnational project of the Caliphate is likely to exclude every chance of 
undertaking a de-radicalization and/or disengagement process in which a group effectively negotiates 
with a nation-state, and this difference is likely to represent one of the major counter-terrorism 
challenges arising from the Syrian-Iraqi scenario.  In order to complete its de-radicalization process, 
the IG issued four books of murāğa’āt, “recantations”, in January 2002, under the general title of The 
Correcting Conceptions Series. The major one was titled The Initiative for Ceasing Violence: a 
Realistic View and a Legitimate Perspective. It was authored by two Shura Council members2 and it 
generally addressed the practical and the ideological reasons behind the initiative. Unquestionably, this 
gradual process has been possible not only thanks to the new attitudes towards violence endorsed by 
al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya, but also to the perceptive reaction of the State. By contrast, the a-national 
nature of the Islamic State obstructs this process. Indeed, after the local-oriented attitude of the first 
gam’iyāt and the emergence of al-Qa’ida as the premium brand of global terror, aims, push factors and 
geographical horizons of jihadism deeply changed. It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a 
binding religious prescription: it unquestionably is. The fundamental issue is whether and how one is 
to conduct it by lawful and prudent means and it is precisely this question that profoundly and 
irremediably divides the national jihadi movements from the Islamic State. As an internal Islamist 
critique - one that relies on a common Salafi substratum - the gam’iyāt refutation of global jihad may 
shed a light over the role of Da’ish in the contemporary jihadi panorama.  
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Introduction  
In the last few months, the Islamic State has been experiencing some significant setbacks both 
in Syria and in Iraq. In April 2016 for instance, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated 
that IS had lost 40% of its territories. At the same time, on the Syrian front, Assad’s army got 
closer to Raqqa, where the government troops have not being present since August 2014. 
More recently, IS lost the city of Dabiq, a recurring symbol in the jihadi propaganda, 
according to which Dabiq will be the place of the final battle between the Caliphate and its 
enemies. Due to these recent defeats and territorial losses, an increasing number of foreign 
fighters is managing to go back to their motherlands in Muslim majority countries and, to a 
lesser extent, in the West.  
The so-called returnees are likely to deploy not only new tactical and guerrilla skills, but also 
a renewed commitment to the Islamic State’s project. Given these premises, dealing with the 
issue of the returnees is becoming increasingly urgent, and governments should be aware of 
the different traits that characterized the Twentieth century Egyptian Islamic Group – and 
allowed it to de-radicalize - compared to the Islamic State ideology and structure.  
The present paper asserts that, in the case of the Islamic State, a process of political de-
radicalization leading the members to abandon violence is extremely unlikely.  
In order to verify this hypothesis, after a brief review of the literature on collective de-
radicalization and two historical introductions on al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya and the Islamic State, 
the nucleus of the paper will be divided in three main sections. Each one of them will 
investigate one of the major differences occurring between the national jihad as exemplified 
by al-Gamā’a and the a-national project of IS.  
Finally, in the conclusive section, some final remarks will be provided.  
 
Al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya: radicalization and de-radicalization patterns  
The Tanzim, literally “organization”, which represented the precursor of both al-Gamā’a al-
Islāmiya and al-Jihad, had its origin in 1974, when some followers of the Islamic Liberation 
Organization (ILO) that was dismantled after its attack on the Military Technical Academy 
reorganized themselves.3   
                                                 
3 On 18 April 1974, 100 members of the Islamic Liberation Organization attacked the Military Technical College 
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By contrast, the first real success of Islamic militants in Egypt occurred when they took over 
Egyptian student politics in the 1970s.4 Religious students established al-Gamā'a al-Dīniya 
(The Religious Group, RG), an inter-university club that aimed at promoting religious social 
and political activism on campuses.   
By the mid-1970s, the clubs had been transformed into a nationwide organization and each 
university had a shura, “consultative council”, and an emir. In 1977, the Muslim Brothers 
were able to recruit the emirs of Cairo, Alexandria, and al-Minya universities.5 However, the 
Brotherhood was not able to recruit the leaders of al-Gamā'a al-Dīniya in Assyut University, 
Nagih Ibrahim and Karam Zuhdi, who will emerge later as co-founders of al-Gamā’a al-
Islāmiya. The Religious Group’s horizons broadened in the 1980s, and while still in control of 
the campuses, they moved out into slum neighbourhoods such as Cairo’s Imbaba and the rural 
backwaters of Upper Egypt.   
From an organizational perspective, the new-born al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya was divided in cells 
and it had separate military and da’wa wings.6 The military wing has been increasingly 
strengthened by the return of Egyptian volunteers from the war against Soviets in 
Afghanistan, who enlarged the so-called group of Afghan Arabs.   
As far as da’wa is concerned, the Islamic Group largely occupied the vacuum left by the 
repressed Muslim Brotherhood, providing citizens with Koranic schools, Islamic-licit loans, 
health clinics and religious literature.   
The ideological principles were divulgated through a network of thousands of unofficial 
mosques and using cassettes, pamphlets, and booklets. 
The Upper Egyptian-dominated IG had numerous contacts with other like-minded, small 
Salafi-Jihadi factions in Cairo and the Delta region.  
The most notable of those factions was that of Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Farag, which later 
came to be known as the principal organizer behind President Sadat's assassination on 
                                                                                                                                                        
nearby in the Arab Socialist Building, seize radio and television buildings and announce the birth of the Islamic 
Republic of Egypt. Ninety-five ILO members were arrested and tried, thirty-two were convicted, and two were 
executed. 
4 Stanley Reed, (1993). The Battle for Egypt. Foreign Affairs, 72(4), 94.  
5 Omar Ashour, (2007). Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of armed Islamist 
movements: the case of Egyptian Islamic Group. Middle East Journal, 61(4), 598. 
6 Da’wa is one of the fundamental concepts of Islamist ideologies, and translating it with the term 
“proselytizing” is simplistic and ineffective. It literally means “issuing a summons” and “making an invitation”, 
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October 6, 1981. Along with Farag, several leading members of the Egyptian jihadi 
movement including Ibrahim, Zuhdi, 'Abbud al-Zummur, and Khalid al-Islambuli participated 
in the assassination. ‘Abbud al-Zummur was the senior military officer in the group and a 
major in the military intelligence. Later, he held several leading positions in the broader 
Egyptian jihadi movement including the leadership of al-Jihad group, while Khalid al-
Islambouli was the leader of the cell that carried out the assassination. In the major crackdown 
that followed Sadat’s death, more than 300 Egyptian Islamist activists and suspects were 
imprisoned. This prison phase was crucial in transforming the essence of al-Gamā’a. In this 
phase, the official split between the Islamic Group and al-Jihad occurred, with al-Jihad being 
then led by 'Abbud al-Zummur and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qa’ida.   
Another development was the production of a large literary corpus regarding the Islamic 
Group ideology, included in the so-called fiqh al-‘unf, “jurisprudence of violence”.7 During 
the 1980s, al-Gamā’a militants numbered around 10,000, with hard-core support several times 
that, and of the total 46,000 mosques in Egypt in 1981, only 6,000 mosques were under the 
control of the Ministry of Awqāf (Religious Endowments)8, which clearly demonstrates the 
ideological ferment in the Egyptian Islamist panorama of the period. The increasing cultural 
influence of IG activism began to alarm authorities, and between 1987 and 1989, the regime 
started a crackdown on al-Gamā’a activists. By early 1989, the IG attempted to stop the 
crackdown by issuing appeals invoking, among other conditions, the release of all detainees 
who were not charged; the improvement of prison conditions for IG activists who were 
sentenced by civilian courts; the suspension of the policy that used to renew detention 
indefinitely.   
The regime ignored these demands, thus contributing to the creation of a vicious circle, which 
culminated with the Luxor massacre on November 17, 1997, in which IG terrorists killed 
fifty-eight tourists at the site. Few months before, on July 5, 1997, during one of the military 
tribunals for IG activists, Muhammad al-Amin 'Abd al-'Alim, an IG member, read a statement 
signed by six of the IG historical leaders declaring a unilateral ceasefire and calling on IG 
                                                 
7 This literature included books like Mithāq al-'Amal al-Islami [Islamic Action Charter] (1984); Kalimat Ḥaqq 
[A Righteous Word] (1984); 'Ilahun ma' Allah? I'lān al-Ḥarb 'ala Mağlis al-Sha'ab [Another God with Allah? 
Declaration of War on the People's Assembly] (1990); Hattmiyat al-Muwāğaha [The Inevitability of 
Confrontation] (1990). 
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affiliates to stop all military operations at home and abroad. It was this declaration that 
heralded the beginning of the de-radicalization phase. After two years of internal debate 
among imprisoned and free IG members, the group reached a full consensus about the 
unilateral ceasefire only on March 28, 1999, when the leaders in Egypt and abroad declared 
their unconditional support for the initiative. In fact, as far as this first phase of de-
radicalization is concerned, speaking about disengagement seems to be more correct. Indeed, 
the notion of de-radicalization implies ideological, emotional and relational changes in the 
individual’s attitudes towards violence, while the concept of disengagement mainly relates to 
the behavioural and pragmatic dimension.9  
A true process of collective de-radicalization represented the second phase of the dialogue 
with the State, and featured a comprehensive attempt to legitimize ideologically the 
transformation, as well as to publicize the doctrinal developments. In order to reach these 
goals, the IG issued four books of murāğa’āt, “recantations”, in January 2002, under the 
general title of The Correcting Conceptions Series. Unquestionably, this gradual process has 
been possible not only thanks to the new attitudes towards violence endorsed by al-Gamā’a 
al-Islāmiya, but also to the perceptive reaction of the State. More exhaustively, disengagement 
and de-radicalization of the Islamic Group have been realized through an unprecedented 
synergy of three intertwined conjunctures: the national dimension of IG interests, the response 
of the State, the organizational and collective structure of the process.    
 
The Islamic State: a historical overview 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian-born terrorist who started to radicalize while in 
prison for drug possession and sexual assault. He travelled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s 
with the intention of joining the fight against Soviet occupation. Back to Jordan during the 
1990s, Zarqawi was arrested for his plots against the Hashemite dynasty. During that decade, 
al-Zarqawi met Osama bin Laden, who, despite al-Zarqawi’s strong hatred for Shiites that bin 
Laden did not agree with and other differing perspectives,10 asked him to join AQ.  
                                                 
9 Alex P. Schmid (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion 
and Literature Review. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-terrorism (ICCT), 14.  
10 Muhammad J. Kirdar (2014). AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series: Al Qaede in Iraq. Center for 
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At that time, al-Zarqawi organization was Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (JTJ), Tawhid11 and 
Jihad Group. JTJ’s first operation was in Jordan, when it organized the murder of USAid 
officer Laurence Foley in 2002.12 
Soon after its birth, JTJ began to actively recruit Iraqis coming from different social and 
geographical backgrounds.13 In October 2004, Zarqawi came to an agreement with bin Laden 
and formally joined al-Qa’ida, renaming his organization al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Despite the 
official pledge of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi and the AQ leadership still 
disagreed on some key tactical issues, such as AQ’s willingness to cooperate with other 
groups against enemies.14  
Less than two years later, on June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was killed by an American airstrike. After 
Zarqawi’s death, AQI announced that his successor would be Abu Ayub al-Masri, an 
Egyptian bomb maker who, as many key-figures of that jihadi landscape, had trained in 
Afghanistan.15 However, many Iraqi Sunnis continued to criticize AQI for the foreign 
presence in its leadership and fighting forces. Therefore, to brand the group as more Iraqi, 
Masri convinced several other groups to merge when he declared the establishment of the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, although the group also continued to be known as AQI). Masri 
installed an Iraqi, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, as the head of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
efforts to unify the jihadi action provided ISI attention and support from the global jihadi 
community. Both Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid on 
April 18, 2010 and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed control of an AQI severely weakened by 
local backlash and coalition and local security forces. AQI continued to struggle to maintain 
relevance through 2011, when Coalition forces withdrew. 
                                                 
11 The concept of taḥwīd represents one of the pillars of the Islamic theology. It refers to the uniqueness, the 
oneness of God. The strong emphasis over the oneness of God implies that shirk, “polytheism” (literally 
“association”), is one of the major sins, second only to apostasy. For an influent perspective on taḥwīd see: 
Abduh, M. Tr. by Ishaq Musa’ad and Kenneth Cragg. The Theology of Unity. George Allen & Unwin, London. 
1966.  
12 Richard Boucher (2004). Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad and 
Aliases.  Archive. U.S. Department of State.  
13 Joseph Felter – Brian Fishman (2007). Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. 
Combatting Terrorism Center, West Point.  
14 For an in-depth analysis of the first stages of the relationship al-Qaida - ISIS see Fawaz A. Gerges (2016). 
ISIS: A History. Princeton: Princeton University Press and Denis N. Baken – Ioannis Mantzikos (2015). Iraq and 
Syria: The Evolution of al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers. In: Al Qaeda: The Transformation of Terrorism 
in the Middle East and North Africa. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 131-142. 
15 Eben Kaplan (2006). Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, Zarqawi's Mysterious Successor (aka Abu Ayub Al-Masri). 
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Meanwhile, AQI used the ongoing Syrian Civil War as a training ground and tool for 
expansion, thus compensating the difficulties it was experiencing in Iraq. In April 2013, 
Baghdadi officially announced AQI operations in Syria and changed the group’s name to the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also claimed that AQI had created al-Nusra in Syria, 
and that the two groups had merged into one. Both al-Nusra leadership and Al Qa’ida leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri disputed the merger. As a reaction, Ayman al-Zawahiri dictated that ISIS 
should limit its operations to Iraq,16 but on June 14 al-Baghdadi publicly rejected al-
Zawahiri’s statement. ISIS continued to operate in Syria, often clashing with other Islamist 
groups and ignoring calls for mediation. Therefore, AQ officially renounced any connection 
with ISIS in February 2014.  
On June 29, 2014, after significant territorial gains in Iraq and Syria, the group changed its 
name again to become known as the Islamic State (IS), declaring a Caliphate and naming its 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the Caliph. In late September 2014, as ISIS continued to expand 
its borders, the U.S. announced that it would begin to carry out airstrikes against the 
organization. By November 2014, the group’s territorial gains had slowed considerably and, 
as mentioned before, the process of territorial loss is ongoing.  
 
Collective de-radicalization: a brief literature review17  
As far as the academia is concerned, there seems to be a clearly recognizable lacuna in this 
field of research, as the overwhelming majority of works are ascribable to a structural-
psychological approach instead of a political-process one.     
Unquestionably, the study of radicalization at the individual level, which has always been 
faced with the former approach, produced some valuable insights, in particular by enhancing 
the understanding of radicalization as a process, an in fieri concept and not merely a 
succession of events.   
                                                 
16 Basma Atassi, "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger." Al Jazeera America, 9 June 2013. 
[http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html].  
17 For a detailed literature review on collective and individual de-radicalization, which lies outside the scope of 
the paper, see Angel Rabasa – Stacie L. Pettyjohn – Jeremy G. Ghez – Christopher Boucek (2010). 
Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND Corporation. Arlington, Virginia and Alex P. Schmid (2013). 
‘Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review’, 
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Nevertheless, this perspective has proved to have more than one shortcoming. For instance, it 
often does not take into adequate consideration historical and geographical variations, 
claiming to be valid in every context and historical horizon. Moreover, the structural-
psychological approach implies that, as radicalization is supposed to be determined by 
structural factors, structural changes are required for de-radicalization to occur.  The case of 
the Egyptian Islamic Group largely confutes this hypothesis. In this respect, Omar Ashour 
was one of the first scholars who have underlined the operative differences between the two 
approaches.18 Furthermore, Ashour’s work is highly relevant from at least three other 
perspectives. Firstly, studying the case of the Egyptian Islamic Group and, to a lesser extent, 
of al-Jihad, he pointed out four prerequisites for a successful de-radicalization process, 
namely charismatic leadership, state repression, interactions with the "other"19 and selective 
inducements from the state.20 Nevertheless, other authors (El-Said, 2012) have added what 
has been called “the general environment” as a factor that may promote organizational de-
radicalization. 
Beside the classification of the four major prerequisites, Ashour’s definitions of de-
radicalization and moderation are highly valuable and have been largely adopted throughout 
this paper. Indeed, de-radicalization is a process of relative change within Islamist 
movements, in which a radical group reverses its ideology and begins to de-legitimize the use 
of violent methods to achieve political goals as well as accepting gradual social, political, and 
economic changes within a pluralist context. Moderation, on the other hand, is a process of 
relative change within Islamist groups that can take place on two levels. On the ideological 
level, the key transformation is the acceptance of democratic principles and the de-
legitimization of violence. On the behavioural level, the key transformation is participation in 
the democratic process and the practical abandonment of violence as a method to achieve 
                                                 
18 Omar Ashour (2007). Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of armed Islamist 
movements: the case of Egyptian Islamic Group. Middle East Journal, 61(4), 596-625.    
 
19 In the present paper, the author chooses not to carry out an in-depth analysis of this prerequisite, the 
interaction. Indeed, due to its complexity and transdisciplinarity, it would deserve a dedicated analysis.  
20 See for instance: Omar Ashour, 2009. The deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist 
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goals. Different levels of moderation can occur within both radical and moderate Islamist 
movements.21 
Finally, even though the Egyptian jihadi landscape has always been Ashour’s main research 
focus, he also studied the Libyan de-radicalization process, thus suggesting a domino effect 
that may be triggered by previous positive de-radicalization experiences.22 
A remarkable effort to close the gap between collective/organizational and individual de-
radicalization has been performed by Clubb through the analysis of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA).23 Building on the morphogenetic approach - a social movement approach – 
Clubb distinguishes between structure/culture and agency over time in order to analyse the 
causal influence between the two. Two main objects are analysed: how actors change attitudes 
to violence and factors ensuring that changes resonate with audiences. Support for terrorism 
and political violence may continue within a movement and inter-generationally, and 
subsequently, any attempt to explain its demise must be holistic and cannot be found solely in 
theories and strategies that focus on how groups or individuals disengage.24 As far as the 
domino effect hypothesized by Omar Ashour is concerned, Gordon Clubbs adds that it not 
only diffuses to other groups: it diffuses throughout the movement, thus affecting the radical 
milieu and the next generation.25 
Previously, Gunaratna and Ali (2009) have been among the first scholars to assess the de-
radicalization processes of the Egyptian Islamic Group and al-Jihad.26 In addition, they 
effectively underline the differences between these cases and other extremist de-radicalization 
programs in the world, which are normally a direct initiative of governments and not of 
terrorist groups.27 Gunaratna and Ali also largely contributed to the debate on the conciliation 
initiative, which raised the question of whether it was merely a tactical move by the IG to win 
a mass release of its imprisoned members and, later, resume violence. This question—whether 
the initiative was tactical or strategic, was asked to Karam Zuhdi, who responded that “the 
                                                 
21 Omar Ashour (2007). Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of armed Islamist 
movements: the case of Egyptian Islamic Group. Middle East Journal, 61(4), 599-600.  
22 Omar Ashour, Ex-Jihadists in the New Libya, Foreign Policy, August 29, 2011. 
23 Gordon Clubb (2016). Social Movement De-Radicalisation and the Decline of Terrorism. The morphogenesis 
of the Irish Republican movement. London: Routledge.  
24 G. Clubb (2016), 2.  
25 G. Clubb (2016), 9.  
26 Rohan Gunaratna, R. – Mohammed B. Ali. (2009). De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A Preliminary 
Insight. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32(4), 277-291. 
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question was out of place and that temporary truce with the Jews might be acceptable, before 
returning to war, but reconciliation among Muslims must not be signed with the intention of 
betrayal”.28 
Wheatley and McCauley29 adopt a different perspective, focussing on the popular reaction to 
the activity of the Egyptian Islamic Group. Indeed, they examine how various levels of 
Egyptian society responded to years of Islamist terror, culminating in the Luxor massacre – a 
watershed event in the loss of sympathy and support for extremist Islamism. Through their 
pyramid model of terrorism and support for terrorism30, they highlight that a terrorist group 
aiming for political power is competing with the government for the sympathy or at least the 
passive acquiescence of the base of the pyramid. Changes over time in this competition can be 
represented as shifts in the numbers of sympathizers and supporters for the terrorists, and 
likewise shifts in sympathizers and supporters for the government. The same competition 
plays out among audiences in other countries, who may sympathize with terrorists, justify 
terrorist violence, or even act in support of terrorists in a country not their own.  
These fundamental contributions produced valuable insights in the field of collective and 
organizational de-radicalization. Nevertheless, highlighting the differences between the 
parabolas of the first gam’iyāt and the Islamic State is becoming increasingly imperative. 
Particularly, the dichotomies national vs transnational interests, response vs absence of the 
State and collective vs individual de-radicalization will now be contextualised.  
 
The national interests of IG as opposed to the Islamic State’s transnational ideology   
During its whole history, al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya in general and its leadership in particular 
maintained an essentially national perspective.  In some respects, the focus has been even 
narrower. For instance, an extraordinary connection between al-Gamā’a militancy and the 
territory of the Upper Egypt and the Sa’idi society has always been a characteristic of the 
organization. This is not to say that the first gam’yiāt did not use to prioritize dīn, “religion”, 
over dawla, “State”. On the contrary, their greatest ideal was the restoration of the Caliphate.    
                                                 
28  Rohan Gunaratna – Mohamed Bin Ali (2009), 287. 
29 Joseph Wheatley – Clark McCauley (2008). Losing your audience: Desistance from terrorism in Egypt after 
Luxor. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. Pathways toward terrorism and genocide, 1(3), 250-268. 




Sara Brzuszkiewicz: Political de-radicalization: why it is no longer possible in the wilāyāt 
system of the Islamic State 
195 
Nevertheless, it remained a vague utopia, and IG interests and push factors were located in an 
Egyptian horizon. 
The primary and immediate targets of al-Gamā’a were the Egyptian rulers, the beneficiaries 
of da’wa were their Egyptian compatriots and, above all, they were aware that the militant 
cause was part of a historically and geographically situated process. Indeed, the Egyptian 
groups – here lies an analogy between al-Gamā’a and al-Jihad - did not focus their activity on 
global jihad: they were primarily concerned with the overthrow of the apostate regimes of 
Anwar al-Sadat first and Hosni Mubarak later. On the contrary, in both Islamic State’s actions 
and narratives, the national dimension has been completely overcome, multi-ethnicity of 
fighters and constituency is a value and the concept of territoriality has been revisited in 
unprecedented ways. Unquestionably, Al-Qa’ida brought terrorism in a transnational 
dimension, but it performed this task focussing on international targets and enemies. The 
Islamic State has gone a step forward, crushing the national boundaries in their narrative, 
hierarchies, propaganda and, most importantly, by establishing what in this paper is called the 
wilāyāt system. After the leader of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared a 
caliphate on June 29, 2014, his spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, stated that “pledging 
allegiance (mubaya‘a) and giving assistance to the caliph […] has become incumbent upon all 
Muslims.” Such pledges of allegiance (bay‘a) have since been given by numerous radical 
Islamist groups from around the world.31  
So far, the Islamic State has proclaimed the creation of many wilāyāt, “provinces” in Muslim 
majority countries. Nevertheless, very few of them imply actual territorial control 
(Wagemakers, 2015). Today, Islamic State provinces are: Wilāyāt Barqa, Fezzān, and 
Tarābulus (Provinces of Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania), in Libya; Wilāya Sinā’ 
(Province of Sinai) in Egypt; Wilāya al-Yaman (Yemen Province); Wilāya Gharb Afriqiyah 
(West Africa Province); Wilāya Khorasān (in Afghanistan and Pakistan); Wilāyāt Haramayn, 
Najd, and Hijaz, in Saudi Arabia; Wilāya al Jaza’ir (Algeria Province); Wilāya Qawqāz 
(Caucasus Province). Moreover, with IS’s expansion, the Umma utopia has gained new 
significance, and the charisma has come to be most concretely located in words and in the 
ability to speak for the transnational Muslim community. Another difference between the last 
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century’s gam’iyāt and the rhetoric of the Islamic State lies in the concept of hijra, 
“migration”, which is now used as a notion of removing oneself, literally or metaphorically, 
from the present corrupt jāīhly society, ‘ignorant of the Revelation’, to live among true 
believers.      
On the contrary, according to the ideology of the Twentieth century’s Egyptian groups, the 
decision of bringing jihad abroad was not only a religious duty, but it also responded to the 
pragmatic need of protecting those youths by sending them in Afghanistan (Mubarak - 
Shadoud - Tamari, 1996, p. 42). This is not to say that the Islamic State lacks in pragmatism 
and vision. Indeed, it has been able to replace al-Qa’ida as the jihadi premium brand and 
overcome its predecessor from strategic, financial and communicative perspectives. 
Nevertheless, the Islamic State project ignores and deliberately violates national through its 
Islamic statehood propaganda, thus totally distancing itself from the former national jihadi 
groups. IS’s worldview consists of a set of binary images on which the whole dunya, “the 
earthly world”, relies. According to Andrew Craig32, some images have a fundamental 
function. The images with harmful intentions are the Barbarian image (Arab Monarchies), 
which has a superior capability but inferior culture; the Degenerate image (the West), which is 
similar to the Barbarian image but with superior capability; an Enemy image (Iran) with 
relatively equal capability and culture; a Dependent of the Enemy image (Shias) that has 
inferior capability and culture but are under the protection of a very capable Enemy Image 
(Cottam, 1994).   
The recourse to sets of opposition like mu ͑min/kāfir, taqwā/fasad, muslim-murtad33 is a 
shared characteristic among both national and transnational jihadi groups. Nevertheless, the 
Twentieth century jihadists tend to locate these antonyms on the national horizon, while the 
Islamic State uses them in the framework of the communicative battle against both the near 
and the far enemy.34 
On the contrary, the set of images of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the other Twentieth 
Century’s gam’iyāt was much more limited and focussed on the apostate regimes that ruled 
                                                 
32 Andrew Craig (2014). The Smiling, Scented Men: The Political Worldview of the Islamic State of Iraq, 2003-
2013. Pullman, Washington State: Washington State University, 38.  
33 Respectively: believer/unbeliever, piety/corruption or decadence, Muslim/apostate.  
34 It is worth noting that each couple of antonyms has its origins in the classical Islamic doctrine, but the 
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they own countries.  In this respect, even in the case of attacks on tourists, the primary aim 
was always to weaken the economy of the State. In order to attract social allies, jihadists 
articulate their worldview in a language akin to Hungtington’s “clash of civilization”, 
whereby mobilization is regarded as a response to insidious Western desire to undermine the 
culture of Muslim societies.35 Nevertheless, they do it differently in different periods and 
analysing this variation could shed light on the evolution of the multiple jihadi narratives.  
 
The response of the State 
Beside the national perspective of the group, the second component of the abovementioned 
synergy, which made it possible for IG to undertake a process of disengagement and de-
radicalization, was the perceptive reaction of the Mubarak regime. Indeed, the national 
horizon of the Twentieth century Egyptian jihadi wave found a correspondence in the reaction 
of the Egyptian government, which activated a balance of repression, dialogue and selective 
inducements. When the imprisoned leaders declared the unilateral ceasefire in 1997, there was 
no coordination with the State, which in fact gave several negative signals and showed a high 
degree of suspicion.  By 1998, the state started interacting with the IG, and this was the 
beginning of the de-repression period (Ashour 2007). Security officials begun to soften the 
measures targeting IG members inside most of prisons.  In the period 1999-2000, prison 
visits, which had been banned since 1993, were gradually allowed, and detention conditions 
slowly improved.  Nevertheless, it was only in December 2001, after the turning point of 9/11, 
that the regime's policies towards al-Gamā’a took another level and the State inaugurated an 
unprecedented coordination with the IG leadership. Indeed, the IG leaders were allowed to 
tour the prisons to spread their revised ideology, the state media gave extensive coverage of 
the transformations, and the regime went as far as funding and disseminating the IG books of 
recantation. Despite these initiatives, some scholars argued that the Egyptian government in 
fact missed several opportunities to foster the process, and welcomed the new attitude of the 
IG only after a prolonged period of hesitation.36 
                                                 
35 Hisham Kandil (2011). Islamizing Egypt? Testing the limits of Gramscian counterhegemonic strategies. 
Theory and Society, 40(1), 41. 
36 Jane Harrigan – Hamed El-Said (2013). Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-Radicalization and 
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Unquestionably, however, after 9/11 the message that the regime of Hosni Mubarak wanted to 
send to the United States and the West was that it was successful in co-opting a former ally of 
al-Qaida, making it innocuous and removing 15,000 to 20,000 potential supporters from its 
camp. On the contrary, this is extremely unlikely to happen in the case of the Islamic State. 
Indeed, not only Dai’sh fighters and constituency are not nationally or ethnically 
homogeneous, but also do not have a sufficiently strong and farsighted nation-state 
interlocutor ready to undertake the set of initiatives that Egyptian government undertook in 
the Nineties.  
 
The importance of the collective and organizational level  
Beside the national dimension of group’s interests and the response of the State, the third 
conjuncture that made the de-radicalization process possible was that they occurred at the 
organizational and collective level, and not at the individual one. Indeed, what is likely to 
occur at the individual level is merely disengagement derived from disillusionment37, 
especially because IS leaders seem to have abandoned the fundamental Islamic norm of al-
amr bi al-ma’rūf wa alnaḥi ‘an al-munkar, “Command the good and forbid the evil”, whereas 
the collective dimension is a prerequisite for a complete process of political de-radicalization.    
In this respect, leadership’s influence plays a major role. The Islamic State organization has 
had several leadership changes over time, experiencing three primary leaders over the past 
decade. The founding leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a 
personalized and charismatic (i.e., attention seeking, malleable goals) leader.  For this reason, 
AQI/ISIL suffered following his death in 2006 due to his lack of information sharing and 
succession planning among top commanders.  
Organizations led by personalized leaders tend to suffer following the removal of that leader, 
as they have failed to adequately plan the succession within their top management team.38 
This did not happen in the case of the Islamic Group, in which each emir followed the 
orthopraxis of consulting the shura and effectively dissimulating the gap between top ranks 
                                                 
37 Anne Speckhard – Ahmet S. Yayla (2015). Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: 
Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit. Perspectives on Terrorism, 9(6), p. 101.  
38 Gina Ligon – Mackenzie Harms – John Crowe – Leif Lundmark – Pete Simi, (2014). The Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant: Branding, Leadership Culture and Lethal Attraction. Final Report prepared for the Department 
of Homeland Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs, award number #2012-ST-
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and new recruits.  Indeed, for a process of organizational and collective de-radicalization to be 
effective, it must occur in a top-down perspective. As far as the effects of collective de-
radicalization are concerned, in 2009, after some major corpuses of recantations had been 
published. Abu Qatada39 commented on these transformations by saying in an interview: “The 
impact of these retreats on us is worse than 100,000 American soldiers”.40 In addition, several 
Islamist leaders and ideologues have argued that without the IG's de-radicalization process, 
there would not have been an al-Jihad one, which ended in 2010.   
Moreover, the case of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) shows that it has been 
largely influenced by the two Egyptian examples, thus demonstrating that a national process 
has the potential to impact on different socio-political scenarios in neighbouring countries.   
This suggests a domino effect hypothesis that can be a subject of future research.   
 
Conclusions   
The comparison between the Egyptian al-Gamā’a al-Islāmiya, which has been active during 
the last three decades of the Twentieth Century, and the wilāyat system of the contemporary 
Islamic State, revealed that a de-radicalization process similar to that undergone by al-Gamā’a 
is no longer conceivable in the case of the Islamic State. This depends on three main reasons, 
the same that made it possible for al-Gamā’a.   
Firstly, the Islamic Group, along with al-Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, had 
specifically national interests and expectations, which is no longer true for IS.   
                                                 
39 Abu Qatada al-Filastini is a Jordanian Salafi cleric Qatada accused of having links to terrorist organizations 
and repeatedly imprisoned in the United Kingdom and Jordan, where courts found him innocent of multiple 
terrorism charges. 
He was deported to Jordan on 7 July 2013, after the UK and Jordanian governments agreed and ratified a treaty 
satisfying the need for clarification that evidence gained through torture would not be used against him in his 
forthcoming trial. 
On 26 June 2014, Abu Qatada was found not guilty by a Jordan court of terrorism charges relating to an alleged 
1998 plot. He remained in prison pending a verdict that was due September 2014 on a second alleged plot. 
Furthermore, on 24 September 2014, a panel of civilian judges sitting at Amman State Security Court cleared 
him of being involved in a thwarted plot aimed at Western and Israeli targets in Jordan during the millennium 
celebrations in 2000. Since February 2012, Abu Qatada has become persona non grata in the United States, 
Belgium, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Algeria.  
In more than one occasion, he expressed extremist views. In October 1999 for instance, he gave a sermon to his 
congregation at London's Finsbury Park mosque in which he told his congregation that American citizens 
"should be attacked, wherever they were" and that "there was no difference between English, Jewish and 
American people”. See: The sayings and sermons of Abu Qatada al-Filistini, The Week, February 7, 2012: 
[http://www.theweek.co.uk/abu-qatada/45114/the-sayings-and-sermons-of-abu-qatada-al-filistini].  
40 Adel Majid, 2009. Ḥiwwār Ma’ al-Sheikh Abu Qatada min Dākhil al-Suğun al-Britanniya [“An Interview with 
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Secondly, the Twentieth Century gam’iyāt had a definite interlocutor, a State, be it Egypt or 
Libya, which had been able to react to the cease-fire announced by the groups through an 
effective management of selective inducements, while the Islamic State could not rely on the 
same kind of institutions.   
Finally, in the framework of the Islamic State’s influence, de-radicalization – or, more 
frequently, disengagement - happens only at an individual level, whereas in order to be 
politically effective it should happen in a collective and organizational dimension.   
For all these reasons, rulers of Muslim-majority countries should understand the potential 
boomerang effect of letting their own jihadists go abroad to fight with the Islamic State. 
Indeed, by doing so, they may well distance the immediate danger, but a potential ground for 
dialogue - the national one - will disappear simultaneously. Like a boomerang, foreign 
fighters are likely to return to their motherlands with unprecedented tactical and operational 























                                                 
41 For an extensive analysis of the risk embodied by the returnees, see: Byman, D. (2015). The Homecomings: 
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